• The proposed California Corridor, is based on a mainline that runs from San Francisco, through California's Central Valley to Los Angeles, with extensions to Sacramento and San Diego. The long-term vision of the national program has a line from Las Vegas to Los Angeles. With all of the commuter rail already in the Los Angeles region, the network could more accurately be described as the Los Angeles Hub. Even the Sacramento line is more oriented to Los Angeles than San Francisco, despite the distance. • The most coherent of the new proposals is the Chicago Hub, which as its name suggests, hubs traffic from other Midwestern cities into Chicago. This proposal has achieved agreement from all of the regional governors, and with a Chicago-based administration in the White House, not surprisingly received a large share of the recent federal allocations ($2.6 Billion).
• The proposed Florida High-speed rail system runs from Miami though West Broward, West Palm Beach, to Orlando, Lakeland, terminating in Tampa with about 10 stations planned. Proposed additional extensions connecting Fort Myers, Jacksonville, and Tallahassee and Pensacola have also been drawn on maps, but these are farther into the future. This could be described as an Orlando Hub. Though Miami is a larger metropolitan area than Orlando, the branching structure is naturally geographically based in Orlando due to it centrality on the Florida peninsula, as well as it central location vis-a-vis tourist traffic. Tourist traffic is important to this line, as stops at Disney and Port Canaveral have been included. It is anticipated the line will carry 2 million travelers yearly ( 5500 per day on 12-18 round trips), and is 324 miles in length in total. With 10 stations, there is an average of 32 miles between stations, which will bear nuisance costs, and 10 station areas, which will see accessibility benefits. The line is anticipated to run along the I-4 and I-95 corridors for significant stretches, so those areas already see some accessibility benefits (at on-ramps and off-ramps) and nuisance costs (between interchanges).
• The Northwest region, or Seattle Hub connects Vancouver, Canada with Salem, Oregon.
• The South-Central region, once dubbed the Texas Triangle, and now the Texas T-Bone, may be described as a Dallas Hub, connecting San Antonio, Austin, Houston, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, Little Rock, and Memphis, among others.
• The Southeast region is probably best described as an Atlanta Hub, as Atlanta is the key interchange in the region (hubbing traffic from Savannah, Jacksonville, Birmingham, Chattanooga, Nashville, Charlotte, and Raleigh), and the largest metropolitan area. There is also a line from Raleigh through Columbia to Savannah, bypassing Atlanta, which is helpful for long-distance train travelers from the Northeast going to Florida, but might not have much local demand.
• The Gulf Coast Corridor, or New Orleans Hub connects Houston to Mobile and Atlanta. This is an official FRA corridor, but seems on a slower track than many of the others, not receiving funding in the most recent round.
• The long term program includes a line from Phoenix to Tucson (a Phoenix Hub), and from Denver to El Paso (a Denver Hub), but these are both isolated corridors, indicated on the long-term vision, without any likelihood for construction in the short-term. Describing these as hubs stretches the meaning of the term, but those are the primary cities on the respective networks, and are the only cities on their networks with significant feeder public transit. While these local spokes do not show on the national high-speed rail network, they still exist, and support the use of the term for these locales.
Conceptual model of accessibility
Accessibility measures the ease of reaching destinations. The higher the travel cost the lower the accessibility. It also measures the value of destinations, the more activities at the destination, the more valuable it is. Accessibility does two things, first it increases total wealth. Agglomeration economies caused by new infrastructure make aggregate output larger. But second, it redistributes wealth, as the locations where the accessibility gains are larger gain more of that aggregate wealth. Places which do not increase accessibility at least as much as average may find themselves losing economic opportunities which will relocate to take advantage of the accessibility benefits.
The reason for describing the hub networks in the previous section in a paper on economic development is that the hubs, because of their respective positions, will capture accessibility benefits disproportionate to their already relatively large share of the population. First order beneficiaries are New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Orlando, as they will be hubs of the new HSR networks. Places where the network branches will also see some benefits, but not as great. Second order beneficiaries are Atlanta and Dallas, which are hubs of the next generation networks. Third order beneficiaries are cities like New Orleans, Kansas City, Louisville and Raleigh which tie together multiple hub networks. Other cities on the networks will also see absolute accessibility gains, people in those cities will be able to reach more people in less time (or with higher quality, or at less out-of-pocket cost). However, while they may achieve absolute gains in accessibility, they may lose in relative position, as a greater share of the now larger total accessibility is accumulated by the hub cities. A simple accessibility model is constructed between five cities, a hub and four spokes. In the first case, it is a strict hub and spoke network, so that to go between any two spokes, one must travel through the hub. It is assumed that otherwise all cities are of equal size (and thus value), and the four spokes are symmetrically placed. In the second case, direct routes between the spokes are constructed, so to go from, e.g., the east spoke to the south spoke there is a direct route (at a distance of √ 2 times the distance between the spoke and the hub), but to go from the east to west spoke cities still requires passage through the hub. Schedules are assumed indifferent.
The accessibility model follows the classic Hansen model (Hansen, 1959) in which impedance is a negative exponential function of time. The results are shown in 5.
As can be seen, as willingness to travel decreases, and as time increases, the advantage over the hub and spoke increases from 1 (no difference) to 4 (the hub has four times the accessibility as a spoke). This is because if the time is great enough (or willingness to travel low enough), people can travel from a spoke to the hub, but the cost of reaching a second spoke through the hub is too great to be valued, while the hub, due to it centrality, can reach all four spokes. In the second case, with direct routes, the same pattern emerges, but the spokes are relatively stronger (though still not as strong as the hub).
Network architecture matters a lot, not just in accessibility, but in user travel time. compare the Swiss railway network and the Japan network, and conclude the mesh-like network with precision timing architecture in Switzerland better serves its population than the hub and spoke mainline system in Japan.
4 Land value creation effects of public transit systems Table 1 summarizes the effects of local transit systems on land use in a variety of US cases. Studies find both accessibility benefits associated with being near stations, and nuisance costs associated with being near lines and away from stations. The effects show for both residential and commercial real estate. The logic underlying these hedonic studies is that the price of house depends on a number of factors, including the characteristics of the house and land and the characteristics of its location. The primary characteristic of interest here is the distance to rail stations. These effects are decomposed statistically. A typical home sold for $272 more for every 100 meters closer to a light rail station; no effect for commercial properties.
13 Landis et al. (1995) San Francisco, CA Five City Study within CA Access was measured as ground distance from commuter rail tracks.
Houses located within 300m from train tracks were sold at a $51,000 discount. Source: Lari et al. (2009) 
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'The estimated functions show that HSR accessibility has at most a minor effect on house prices" in Taiwan. (Andersson et al., 2010) Examination of local land uses around international high-speed rail stations suggests that were it not for commuter traffic, the effects on land use will not necessarily be localized near the station, the way they would with a public transit station. Downtown stations, if they were to see land use benefits, should see higher local densities, higher local rents, and the construction of air rights over the station and local yards.
Eurostar is a heavily used high-speed rail line connecting London and Paris, serving 9.2 million passengers per year. Gare du Nord in Paris, which serves Eurostar, has local land uses largely indistinguishable from other areas of Paris. St. Pancras in London similarly. Ebbsfleet International Rail Station and Ashford International Rail Station are surrounded by surface parking lots.
Tokaido Shinkansen, connecting Tokyo and Osaka and serving 151 million passengers annually, is an order of magnitude more successful. The densities around stations on this line are visibly higher, but still air rights are partially, but not fully developed, indicating limits to how valuable the land is, even in Tokyo. Shin-Osaka station is adjacent to surface parking lots.
The development effects are not local (unlike public transit stations), which is not surprising since if they are serving long distance travel they are also serving less frequent travel, and as a consequence the advantages of being local to the station are weaker. Where they share space with local transit system hubs, the effects would be difficult to disentangle.
Economic development effects of proposed high-speed rail systems
There is no grounded empirical work to date on the economic development impacts of high-speed rail in the United States, since such services do not exist. Little has been written from objective (as opposed to vested) sources. The Congressional Research Service has tried to balance the arguments:
Promoting Economic Development "HSR, according to supporters, promotes economic development, as well as potentially beneficial changes in land use and employment. In the short term, it is argued, jobs will be created in planning, designing, and building HSR. By improving accessibility, HSR, it is thought, will spur economic development and the creation of long-term jobs, particularly around high-speed rail stations. For example, the California High-speed rail Authority argues that its proposal for a HSR connecting northern and southern Californian cities will create 160,000 short-term construction-related jobs, and 450,000 long-term jobs.
Although skeptics point out that increasing spending on anything will create shortterm jobs, some research shows that infrastructure spending tends to create more jobs than other types of spending. 5 In terms of longer-term benefits, however, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that quantifying these benefits can be difficult, and "while benefits such as improvements in economic development and employment may represent real benefits for the jurisdiction in which a new high-speed rail service is located, from another jurisdiction's perspective or from a national view they may represent a transfer or relocation of benefits."
6 On the question of whether HSR can provide economic benefits for the national economy as a whole by increasing depth of labor markets and improving business travel, the UK transportation policy study discussed earlier notes that "such effects are quite limited in mature economies with well developed infrastructure." 7 This study notes that building a HSR line between London and Scotland would probably provide modest economic benefits at best because air carriers already provide fast and frequent service at a reasonable cost for business and other travelers." (Peterman et al., 2009) The job estimates from California cited in the preceding paragraph would be enormous if they could be validated. A single infrastructure project creating 450,000 jobs, (out of a total civilian employment of under 16 million 8 ) gives a total of almost 3 percent of the state's workforce. The construction related jobs alone are 1 percent of the state's workforce. Presently, construction is 577,000 jobs, so this project would absorb on the order of one-third to one-fourth of all construction jobs in the state.
While the propaganda of project promoters may not be plausible, logically there are some regional effects. An argument could be made about strengthening intercity linkages to refashion the current metropolitan system into a megalopolitan system, where people more regularly interact between cities. One could envision this as Switzerland writ large. If, as Adam Smith suggests, the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and transportation can be used to expand the market, the division of labor can therefore increase (i.e. be more specialized), which should have some positive effects for the economy (akin to agglomeration economies). Melo et al. (2009) conduct a meta-analysis of estimates of urban agglomeration economies from 34 studies. The ranges of effects are quite large, and no clear conclusions about the magnitudes can be drawn. The authors write "The findings support the intuition that agglomeration estimates for any particular empirical context may have little relevance elsewhere.". Whether HSR will expand markets then depends on whether it is faster (point-to-point) than alternative transportation modes, or allows users to be more productive, which depends again on context. Elhorst and Oosterhaven (2008) estimate indirect benefits on top of direct benefits from a Maglev system proposed for the Netherlands. While there is no uniform multiplier, the values for the cases they examined the indirect benefits and costs: Additional consumer benefits, Indirectly reduced congestion, Spatial labor market relocation effects, Spatial labor market size and matching effects, and International labor market effects. These indirect benefits range from 0 to 38 percent of the direct benefits.
Interviews with decision-makers at firms in Utrecht, Netherlands, finds some firms located to be near the perceived accessibility of urban transit and intercity rail networks, while others were indifferent. However "High-speed trains did not have a significant impact on the location choice of any of the firms" because the advantages over conventional trains were small and connections required transfers anyway (Willigers, 2003) . Nakamura and Ueda (1989) (cited in (Sands, 1993) ) finds three of the six prefectures in Japan with a Shinkansen station had higher population growth than the national average between 1980 and 1985, while no prefecture without the Shinkansen grew faster than the national average. Whether the causality is that the rail caused the growth or areas expected to grew attracted investment is unclear. Similar studies conducted of metropolitan growth find results that suggest that Shinkansen and growth are correlated (e.g. (Hirota, 1984) reported in (Brotchie, 1991) ), but the causal structure is not clear. Recent studies suggest the effects of the newer Shinkansen lines are not as favorable as earlier lines . Sands (1993) concludes the Shinkansen has shifted growth, but not induced it. Albalate and Bel (2010) report "Esteban Martín (1998) claims that cities served by [High Speed Trains (HSTs)] benefit from improved accessibility, but at the same time there is a downgrading of conventional train services and air services on those lines where a HST alternative exists. HSTs do not appear to attract advanced services companies, which show no greater propensity to locate in areas neighboring HST railway stations. And while business tourism and conferences benefit from HST services, a reduction in the number of overnight stays cuts tourist expenditure and the consumption of hotel services. Interestingly, while a HST line improves accessibility between the cities connected by the service, it disarticulates the space between these cities -what has been referred to as the tunnel effect (Gutiérrez Puebla and García Palomares, 2005) . Hence, HST lines do not seem to increase inter-territorial cohesion, but rather they promote territorial polarization."
Reviewing the effects in Japan, Europe, and other sites with HSR, Sands (1993) , anticipates that "in California, high-speed rail would reinforce existing population and employment patterns and future growth trends." Kim (2000) anticipates that HSR in South Korea will concentrate population in and around Seoul, while it will disperse employment.
While HSR benefits its users, "the high investment in HST infrastructure could not be justified based on its economic development benefits since these are not certain" (Givoni, 2006) .
Nuisance effects of proposed high-speed rail lines
High-speed rail while providing potential benefits at the nodes, guarantees costs along the lines. Evidence from hedonic price studies (the same kind of studies that were used to assess the accessibility benefits of public transit in a previous section) show that each additional decibel of noise reduces home value by 0.62 percent (Levinson et al., 1997) . Using the methodology in Levinson et al. (1997) , the noise per train, and the number of trains per hour determine a noise exposure forecast. Applying the noise exposure forecast to the number of houses effected by each level of noise, and summing over all of the houses, and multiplying by the value of each house, gives the economic noise damages associated with the trains. So for instance, for a project running 20 trains per hour at 241 km/h through an area with 1000 housing units per square kilometer, each with a value of $250,000 would produce a total noise damage cost per kilometer of track of $1.975 million, a not insignificant cost. For a line of 500 km, this would be a system noise cost of nearly $1 billion. These relationships are non-linear, even one train per hour would produce a total cost of $269 million. Running 20 trains at an average speed of 350 km/h would produce a cost of $1.5 billion.
The noise damages can be avoided if preventive measures are adopted. These include acquiring a much wider right-of-way so there is no housing near the tracks, or noise walls. Whether those costs are less expensive than accepting damages depends on the circumstances.
Summary and conclusions
This paper reviewed the state of HSR planning in the United States c. 2010. The plans generally call for a set of barely inter-connected hub-and-spoke networks.
• There is sometimes a danger of a planner falling in love with his map. There is no danger here, even the same agencies have random maps. It seems as no one cares where the lines actually go, so long as they are high-speed rail.
• The marketers have also made a mistake, 220 miles per hour sounds a lot slower (and less futuristic) than 350 kilometers per hour.
• The US carries a greater share of freight by rail than Europe. Converting rights-of-way into passenger only (which is required for HSR) may cost some of that freight share.
• Any money spent on HSR cannot be spent on something else. The issue of opportunity costs is seldom metnioned.
The evidence from US transit systems shows that lines have two major impacts. There are positive accessibility benefits near stations, but there are negative nuisance effects along the lines themselves. High speed lines are unlikely to have local accessibility benefits separate from connecting local transit lines because there is little advantage for most people or businesses to locate near a line used infrequently (unlike public transit). However they may have more widespread metropolitan level effects. They will retain, and perhaps worse, have much higher, nuisance effects. A previous study of the full costs of high-speed rail in California (Levinson et al., 1997) showed that the noise and vibration costs along the line would be quite significant. Some examples are reported here, typical lines may have noise damage costs on the order of $1 billion.
If high-speed rail lines can create larger effective regions, that might affect the distribution of who wins and loses from such infrastructure. The magnitude of agglomeration economies is uncertain (and certainly location-specific), but I think presents the best case that can be made in favor of HSR in the US.
That said, remember that real HSR (not the short term improvements to get to 90 or 110 MPH, which may or may not be a good thing, but are certainly not HSR) is a long term deployment, so it needs to be compared with cars 10 or 20 or 30 years hence, and the air transportation system over the same period. Cars are getting better from both an environmental perspective and from the perspective of automation technologies. The DARPA Urban Challenge vehicles need to be bested to justify HSR. Cars driven by computers, which while sounding far off is technologically quite near, should be able to attain relatively high speeds (though certainly not HSR speeds in mixed traffic). Further they may move less material per passenger than HSR (trains are heavy), and so may net less environmental impact if electrically powered. Aviation is improving as well, both in terms of its environmental impacts and its efficiency. Socially-constructed problems like aviation security or congestion can be solved for far less money than is required for any one high-speed rail line.
The local land use effects of HSR are likely to be small to non-existent. The agglomeration benefits may exist, but there is little grounds for concluding their size. Source: Spiekermann and Wegener (1994) 24
